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Abstract This paper analyzes the different compositions of the Catalan governing
coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some predictions about the
coalitions that can be expected in the future. During this period, in Catalan politics,
there have been two main political issues over which the different parties have taken
positions: rightist versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus
centralist with respect to the power distribution within the state. I ﬁnd that for any
allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a party that has a clear advantage in
terms of being able to decide the composition of the governing coalition. I show the
features that allow a party to become the key party and those that affect the size of the
advantage of the key party.
Keywords Government formation · Catalan politics
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers C72 · D72
1 Introduction
During the current Spanish democratic period, in Catalan politics, there have been
two main political issues over which the different parties have taken positions: rightist
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Table 1 Distribution of seats among parties in the Catalan parliament
80 84 88 92 95 99 03 06
CIU 43 72 69 70 60 56 46 48
ERC 14 5 6 11 13 12 23 21
AP –1 1 6–––––
PPC – – – 7 17 12 15 14
UCD 1 8 –––––––
CDS ––3–––––
C –––––––3
PSC 33 41 42 40 34 52 42 37
PSUC 2 5 6––––––
PSA 2–––––––
IC− EV ––971 1 391 2
versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus centralist with
respect to the power distribution within the state. For a description of the Catalan
nationalist movements see Guibernau (1997) and Weiss (2002).
Giventherelevanceofthesetwoissues,Catalanpartieshavedeﬁnedtheirideologies
takingpositionsoverthem.Eventhoughattheﬁrstelectionsoftheperiod(1980)there
were six parties competing, over the years the parliament seats have been allocated
to mainly four parties, with different ideal positions in the two dimensional policy
space: CIU nationalist and rightist, ERC nationalist and leftist, PPC centralist and
rightist, and PSC centralist and leftist. Table 1 contains the results of all elections for
the Catalan parliament held between 1980 and 2006.
In order to analyze formally the formation of a governing coalition in this envi-
ronment I will use the model described in Aragones (2007) specially suited for four
parties competing in a two-dimensional policy space. Applying the results found in it,
I ﬁnd that for any allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a party that has
a clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the composition of the governing
coalition. I show the features that allow a party to become the key party and those that
affect the size of the advantage of the key party.
Throughout this paper it should be understood that a governing coalition refers to
the coalition of parties that offers support to the government, and it does not refer
necessarily to the allocation of cabinet ministers. Laver and Schoﬁeld (1990)o f f e r
a detailed description of the roles of executive and legislative coalitions in european
democracies.
After almost 40years of dictatorship in 1977 the ﬁrst democratic elections were
held in Spain. In 1978 took place a referendum on the current Spanish Constitu-
tion. It allowed for a new regime that included a system of Autonomous Commu-
nities. In 1979 took place a referendum on the Catalan Statute and in 1980 the ﬁrst
Catalan parliament was elected. Guibernau (1997) offers a detailed description of
the Spanish transition to the ‘state of autonomies’. Colomer (1998) describes the
decentralization process of Spain and compares it to different federal and regional
organizations.
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With respect to the Catalan governing coalitions formed during the democratic
period we have that in 1980 the governing coalition that formed included CIU, ERC,
and UCD. This election can also be thought of as a transition election, since political
parties were being formed and legalized after forty years of dictatorship.
In the ﬁrst three elections after 1980, CIU obtained an absolute majority of seats in
the parliament. Obviously in those cases (the legislatures starting at 1984, 1988, and
1992) the government was formed by party CIU alone; there was no need to bargain
overpolicy,andthepolicyimplementedwasdeterminedbyCIUalone.Inthenexttwo
elections, corresponding to the legislatures starting at 1995 and 1999, the governing
coalition that formed was CIU with PPC. Finally, the governing coalitions formed in
2003 and 2006, included PSC, IC and ERC.
Formal model: Aragones (2007) describes a model of government formation in a
two dimensional policy space and shows how a given electoral result leads to a given
government.Thepredictionsaredescribedbyacoalitionofpartiessupportedbyama-
jorityofvotes,andapolicysupportedbythepartiesinthecoalition.Acharacterization
of all stable government conﬁgurations in terms of coalitions and policies is provided.
The solution concept used is based on stable governing coalitions. The concept of
the core, borrowed from cooperative game theory [see, for instance, Moulin (1988)
or Myerson (1991)] is used as a measure of stability. This assumption is particularly
relevant when I consider the formation of the coalition that sustains an executive in
ofﬁce on the basis of a conﬁdence vote. The members of this coalition consume all
the beneﬁts of ofﬁce-holding, and have the control of all policy outputs. There is no
binding agreement in this coalition: a non-conﬁdence motion may be proposed at any
time. In the legislative bargaining model that I present the non-empty core conditions
described by Plott (1967) are satisﬁed for a large range of parameter values. These
conditions guarantee the formation of a stable governing coalition.
It is assumed that parties care mostly about holding ofﬁce, and only instrumen-
tally about policy, that is, they are concerned about their policy choice because by
compromising their ideology today, they might jeopardize their vote support in future
elections and thus their future expected payoff in terms of their probability of holding
ofﬁce in the future. A party’s current value of holding ofﬁce is represented with an
exogenous positive constant. The value of holding ofﬁce can be also thought of as
an individual rationality constraint for the party: it represents the maximal amount of
utility that it is willing to give up in terms of policy. For example, a party that attaches
a large value to holding ofﬁce might be willing to commit to policies far away from
its ideal point in order to guarantee becoming a member of the winning coalition.
Iassumecompletepartydiscipline,thatis,Iassumethatallmembersofapartyhave
the same preferences. Therefore, I deﬁne the preferences and actions of a given party
as representing the preferences and actions of all its members. I assume that different
parties have different ideal points in a two dimensional policy space. I consider four
partieswhoseidealpointsarerepresentedbytheverticesoftheunitsquare.Ifdifferent
parties share the same ideological position over the two relevant dimensions I assume
that they form a natural coalition that acts as a unique strategic agent when bargaining
to form a government. However, in most cases I ﬁnd a unique party for each position.
Thus, I can classify the parties into four ideological groups (see Table 2). The groups
identiﬁed as CIU, ERC and PPC represent the corresponding party.
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Table 2 Distribution of seats among ideological groups in the Catalan parliament
80 84 88 92 95 99 03 06
CIU 43 72 69 70 60 56 46 48
ERC 14 5 6 11 13 12 23 21
PPC 18 11 9 7 17 12 15 17
PSC+ IC 60 47 51 47 45 55 51 49
The case of PPC needs a justiﬁcation: I have identiﬁed it with UCD, CDS and AP
before 1992, when PPC was created. The reason is that it can be thought that over
time these parties have only changed their name but not their ideology. I have also
included in the ideological group ‘rightist and centralist’ denoted by PPC the seats
obtained by the party “Ciutadans” during the last election. According to his ideology,
this party could be included in either PSC or PPC, and in either case my results would
not be affected. I have chosen to add this small party to the other smallest party, PPC,
in order to make my results stronger.
Similarly, the creation of IC in 1988 can be thought of as a replacement of a former
leftist party, PSUC. The fourth group identiﬁed as PSC+IC represents two different
socialist parties. Since 1988, PSC obtains one of the largest share of the votes and
IC obtains one of the smallest. In addition they share a leftist ideology and none of
them has shown a clear nationalist one. Thus, it does not seem a strong assumption to
consider them as a natural coalition.
Iassumethatagoverningcoalitioncanonlybeformedwiththesupportofamajority
of the votes of the parliament, that is, it must be a winning coalition according to
majority rule. And I also assume that only governing coalitions can decide on the
policy to be implemented. In case a single party has a majority, it can implement
its ideal point on both issues. My interest focuses on those cases in which no party
has a majority. In my formal analysis I will identify a minority government with the
coalition that has offered its support to allow the formation of the government, even
in those cases in which only one party enters the cabinet.
Using this model I ﬁnd that in the Catalan political environment for any allo-
cation of parliament seats only two scenarios are possible: either there is a party
that is a member of almost all equilibrium coalitions (dominant party scenario) or
there is a party that is never a member of an equilibrium coalition (dominated party
scenario). I ﬁnd that in each one of these scenarios there is a key party: a party
that has a clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the composition of the
governing coalition. I characterize the key party for each possible scenario and I show
that it is sufﬁcient that the key party has intense preferences over one of the issues
to guarantee the formation of a stable government coalition. In addition, I show the
features that allow a party to become the key party and those that affect the size
of the advantage of the key party. Using these results, I analyze the different go-
vernments that have formed in Catalonia between 1980 and 2006, and I offer some
predictions about the different government conﬁgurations that can be expected in the
future.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the formal
model. Section 3 characterizes the coalitions that may form in equilibrium and the
policiesthatcanbesupportedinequilibriumbysuchcoalitions.Section4containsthe
discussion of the results and some possible extensions of the formal model. Section 5
describestheimplicationsoftheresultsoverpastandfuturegovernmentsofCatalonia.
Finally Sect. 6 presents some strategic implications for the Catalan parties.
2 The model
IanalyzeanapplicationofthemodeldescribedinAragones(2007)thatﬁtsthespeciﬁc
features of the Catalan political environment. I consider a two-dimensional policy
space represented by  2. I denote a policy by (e,s) ∈  2 and I interpret e and s as a
pair of policy positions on the two issues: economic policy and nationalism, denoted
respectively by E and S. Parties are characterized by their ideal points in the policy
space. Let (ei,si) ∈  2 denote the ideal point of party i. I assume that there are four
parties denoted PSC+IC, ERC, CIU, and PPC. I normalize their ideal points in such
a way that they can be represented by (0,0),(0,1),(1,1), and (1,0) respectively.
That is, on the economic issue 0 represents a leftist position and 1 represents a rightist
position, whereas on the nationalist issue 0 represents a centralist position and 1
represents a nationalist position. Assuming that the ideal points of the parties are
located at the edges of the unit square simpliﬁes greatly the analysis. A discussion
about how it could be relaxed without affecting qualitatively the results can be found
in Aragones (2007).
I assume that an election has already taken place, and the proportions of parliament
seats that each party has obtained are given by vPSC+IC,vERC,v CIU, and vPPC.
Thus, I have that vPSC+IC + vERC + vCIU + vPPC = 1 and 0 ≤ vi ≤ 1 for all
i ∈ {PSC+ IC, ERC, CIU, PPC}.
I will restrict my analysis to the cases in which vi < 1
2 for all i. The case in which
there is a party i such that vi > 1
2 leads to a trivial analysis: this party alone will form
the government and the implemented policy will coincide with its ideal point. The
case in which there is a party i such that vi = 1
2 is not considered either, because it is
not possible in the Catalan parliament since the number of seats is odd (135 seats).
I assume that parties are mainly concerned about holding ofﬁce, that is, they derive
utilityfrombeingmembersofthegoverningcoalition.Ialsoassumethatthegoverning
coalition has to implement a policy. Even though this model does not consider any
strategic role played by the voter, I assume that at each election voters decide their
votebyevaluatingpartiesaccordingtothepolicieschosenwhileinofﬁce.Sincevoters
care about the policy implemented I assume that they consider the members of the
governing coalition responsible of the policy choice made. Therefore, even though I
assume that parties are mainly concerned about holding ofﬁce, I have that, indirectly,
partiesthataremembersofthegoverningcoalitioncareaboutthepolicyimplemented,
since it may affect their vote support in future elections. I assume that the payoffs of
parties that are not members of the governing coalition are not affected by the policy
choice of the government, since voters do not hold responsible of the policy choice
thosepartiesthatarenotinthegoverningcoalition.Inormalizetheutilityofapartythat
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is not a member of the governing coalition to zero, and I represent the utility that party
i obtains if it becomes a member of the governing coalition when the implemented
policy is (e,s) ∈  2 by Ui (e,s). Therefore, I can write the payoff function of party
i as follows:
Vi (C,(e,s)) =

0i f i / ∈ C
Ui (e,s) if i ∈ C
whereC denotesthegoverningcoalition,(e,s)representstheimplementedpolicyand
Ui (e,s) is given by:
Ui (e,s) = ki −  i (e − ei)2 − σi (s − si)2 with  i,σ i > 0 and  i + σi = 1.
where ki ∈  + represents the utility that a party derives from being a member of
the governing coalition. According to this utility function, parties’ preferences over
policies are single peaked and convex but not necessarily symmetric. The parame-
ters  i and σi represent the relative importance of the two issues in the ideology of
partyi.Ifσi =  i,bothissues,nationalismandeconomicpolicy,havethesameweight
on the utility that party i derives from the policy implemented, thus both issues are
as important in the ideology of the party. If σi >  i the position taken on nationalism
is regarded as more valuable than the position taken on economic policy by party i,
and if σi <  i the position taken on economic policy is regarded as more important
than the party’s position on nationalism. We have that as the value of σi increases,
nationalism becomes more important for party i, and therefore party i requires a more
favorablecompromiseonnationalismforagivendealoneconomicpolicy(seeFig.1).
I rule out the possibility that σi = 0o rσi = 1 (thus,  i = 1o r i = 0), since these
extreme preferences are rarely observed in the case I analyze: all parties always have
cared about both issues.
A necessary condition for a coalition to become a governing coalition is that it has
the support of a majority in the parliament. I deﬁne a winning coalition as a coalition
of parties whose members hold a majority of seats in the parliament.
Within this framework I deﬁne an equilibrium outcome as a pair formed by a win-
ning coalition and a policy compromise, such that there is no other winning coalition
e
s
e e 
s s
εi = σi εi < σi εi > σi
Fig. 1 Indifference curves
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that could form and offer a policy that would improve the welfare of all its members,
that is, I assume that an equilibrium outcome has to satisfy the stand-alone principle.
Deﬁnition AnequilibriumoutcomeisacoalitionofpartiesC∗,andapolicy(e∗,s∗) ∈
 2 such that: i) C∗ is a winning coalition. ii) There is no (C,(e,s)) such that C is
a winning coalition and Vi (C,(e,s)) ≥ Vi (C∗,(e∗,s∗)) for all i ∈ C, with at least
one strict inequality.
The assumptions of this model and the deﬁnition of equilibrium imply that all the
policiesthatarerelevantformyanalysiswilllieintheParetoset,thatis,theunitsquare
[0,1]2. Furthermore, all equilibrium policies will be Pareto Optimal and Individually
Rational within the equilibrium coalition.
Given a set of parameter values for each party (ki,v i,σ i) for eachi ∈{PSC+ IC,
ERC,CIU, PPC}, in equilibrium, generically I have a unique equilibrium coalition
and a continuum of equilibrium policies.
2.1 Acceptable policy sets
The utility that a party obtains from becoming a member of the governing coalition,
ki, may also be thought of as its reservation value: a party will never accept to become
a member of a governing coalition if it has to support a policy from which it derives
a (dis)utility larger than the value that the party obtains from holding ofﬁce.
Formally,thesetofpoliciesthatpartyi iswillingtoacceptasgovernmentproposals
whenhisalternativeistostayoutofofﬁce,isgivenby A(i) = {(e,s) : Ui (e,s) ≥ 0}.
The size of these sets depend on the value of ki : the larger the value of holding ofﬁce
the larger the set of policies that party i is willing to support in a given governing
coalition, that is, the more a party values to be a member of the governing coalition
the more ﬂexible it will be in terms of trading-off policy. See Fig. 2.
Awinningcoalitionthatpretendstoformagovernmentfacesabargainingproblem:
the coalition members have to commit to a common policy position. We will say that
a policy is acceptable by a certain coalition if there is no other policy that gives a
larger utility to one of the parties and no smaller to the others, and gives at least the
reservation value to all parties. This implies that an acceptable policy gives all parties
in the coalition a utility level of at least their reservation value and it is Pareto Optimal
within the coalition’s bargaining set. I represent the set of policies that are acceptable
by a coalition of two parties i and j by A(i, j). See Fig. 3.
Generally, let A(C) denote the set of policies that coalition C is willing to accept
as government proposals when the alternative of each member is to stay out of ofﬁce.
Thus, A(C) =∩ i∈C A(i). The size of these sets depend on the value of ki for the
members of the coalition: and also on the values of their relative preference intensity.
We need some notation that refers to the boundaries of these sets. Let

e∗
ij,s∗
ij

denote the maximal element in the set A(j) according to party i’s policy preferences,
Ui (e,s), that is

e∗
ij,s∗
ij

= argmax
e,s Ui (e,s) s.t. (e,s) ∈ A(j)
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e
s
PSC+IC  PPC
ERC
UPSC-IC
UERC
UPPC
UCIU
• •
••
CIU
Fig. 2 Acceptable set of policies by each party
A(ERC,CIU)
e
s
0 1 
1
• •
••
A(ERC,PSC-IC)
A(PSC-IC, PPC)
A(CIU,PPC) 
Fig. 3 Acceptable sets of policies by coalitions of two parties that agree on one issue
From the assumptions of my model it is easy to show that this maximal element is
unique. Given

e∗
ij,s∗
ij

let’s deﬁne u∗
ij = Ui

e∗
ij,s∗
ij

that represents the maximal
utility level that party j can offer to party i.
Finally,given

e∗
ij,s∗
ij

let eijand sijbedeﬁnedsuchthatUi

 eij,si

= Ui

e∗
ij,s∗
ij

and Ui

ei, sij

= Ui

e∗
ij,s∗
ij

respectively.
In particular, we will have that if parties i and j agree on issue e, then e∗
ij = ei and
 sij = s∗
ij. Similarly, if parties i and j agree on issue s, then s∗
ij = si and eij = e∗
ij.
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2.2 Winning coalitions
The assumptions of my model and the deﬁnition of equilibrium imply that, generi-
cally, equilibrium coalitions must be minimal winning coalitions. A minimal winning
coalition is deﬁned as a winning coalition that would not be supported by a majority
of seats in the parliament (would not be a winning coalition) if one of its party mem-
bers was removed from it. The stand-alone principle implies that generically1 we will
have that only minimal winning coalitions can be part of an equilibrium outcome, as
predicted by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953).
Given the proportion of seats of each party in the parliament, vPSC+IC, vERC,
vCIU, and vPPC, we have only two possible different scenarios in equilibrium:
1. In the “dominant party scenario”, there is a party that is a member of all winning
coalitions of two parties. We are in this scenario whenever the coalition formed
by the largest and the smallest party is a winning coalition.
2. In the “dominated party scenario”, there is a party that is not a member of any
minimalwinningcoalition.Weareinthisscenariowheneverthecoalitionformed
by the largest and the smallest party is not a winning coalition.
Furthermore, whenever there is a minimal winning coalition of three parties we are in
thedominantpartyscenario;otherwise,whenthereisnominimalwinningcoalitionof
three parties, we are in the dominated party scenario. This result is stated and proven
in Aragones (2007).
In order to illustrate this result consider my four parties and the share of parliament
seats that each one controls and suppose that: vCIU ≥ vPSC+IC ≥ vERC ≥ vPPC.
If vCIU + vPPC > 1
2 then we are in the dominant party scenario, where the party
with the largest number of seats, CIU, is the dominant party.
Otherwise, we must have that vCIU + vPPC < 1
2. In this case we are in the
dominated party scenario, where the party with the smallest number of seats, PPC,
is the dominated party.
Notice that I do not consider the cases in which one party or one coalition holds
exactly one half or exactly one quarter of the seats of the parliament. The reason is
that in the Catalan parliament there are 135 seats, and therefore, those cases can never
be observed.
Observe that the dominant party is always the party with the largest number of
seats but the party with the largest number of seats is not necessarily the dominant
party. Similarly, the dominated party is always the party with the smallest number of
seats but the party with the smallest number of seats is not necessarily the dominated
party.
1 Non generically, we can have that a non minimal winning coalition is part of an equilibrium outcome,
butinthatcase therewould also beaminimal winningcoalition thatis partof anequlibrium such thatitsset
of equilibrium policies coincides with the corresponding to ﬁrst one. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we will restrict our equilibrium analysis to minimal winning coalitions.
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3 Equilibrium governing coalitions
Ihave shownbeforethat given thedistributionofparliament seatsamong thefourpar-
ties, there are only two possible scenarios: a dominant party scenario and a dominated
party scenario. If we look at the electoral results in the different legislatures of the
Catalanparliamentweﬁndthatovertimethedistributionofseatssatisﬁesthefollowing
condition:
vCIU,vPSC+IC >> vERC,vPPC
This condition is reinforced by the electoral results obtained by these parties in
the other elections, such as municipal elections, state elections, european parliament
elections, etc. It implies that the possibilities for the Catalan parliament are restricted
to those cases in which the dominant party is either PSC+IC or CIU, and those cases
in which the dominated party is either ERC or PPC.
In this section, I analyze for each scenario the different governing coalitions that
will form in equilibrium and the policy implemented in each case. I assume that for
all relevant coalitions the sets of acceptable policies are not empty, whenever it is not
stated otherwise.
3.1 Dominant party scenario
Suppose that we are in the dominant party scenario and CIUis the dominant party. In
thiscasewehavethat:vCIU+vERC > 1
2,v CIU+vPSC+IC > 1
2,v CIU+vPPC > 1
2,
and vPSC+IC + vERC + vPPC > 1
2. The minimal winning coalitions are given by:
CIUwith ERC,CIUwith PSC+IC,CIUwith PPC, and PSC+ICwith ERC
and PPC.
The relevant strategies in this scenario are the following: party CIU may decide
to offer a proposal to form a coalition to any of the other three parties, and each one
of the other parties may decide either to accept the proposal from party CIU or to
join the three party coalition: PSC+ IC with ERCand PPC. Thus, there are four
possible outcomes in this scenario. I divide the analysis into four different cases that
coverallthepossibilities.Thesecasesdependonwhetherthesetofacceptablepolicies
for coalition CIUwith PSC+ IC is empty or not and whether the set of acceptable
policiesforthethreepartycoalition(PSC+ICwith ERCand PPC)isemptyornot.
Case 1: A(CIU, PSC+ IC) = ∅ and A(PSC+ IC, ERC, PPC) = ∅
First, suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIUwith PSC+IC
is empty, and the set of acceptable policies for the three party coalition is also empty.
In this case, the only possibilities for equilibrium are CIUwith ERCand CIUwith
PPC. Thus, CIU has to choose his governing partner between ERC and PPC.
Since neither ERCor PPCcan have an alternative feasible offer to form a governing
coalition, they can only compete between themselves to become CIU’s partner in the
governing coalition.
Since ERC’s maximal compromise policy is (e∗
CIU,ERC,1) and PPC’s is
(1,s∗
CIU,PPC), by comparing the utility that CIU derives from each offer we can
ﬁnd out the equilibrium outcome. Since
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UCIU(e∗
CIU,ERC,1) = kCIU −  CIU

1 − e∗
CIU,ERC
2
UCIU(1,s∗
CIU,PPC) = kCIU − σCIU

1 − s∗
CIU,PPC
2
and e∗
CIU,ERC =

kERC
 ERC, s∗
CIU,PPC =

kPPC
σPPC and  CIU = 1 − σCIU, we have that
in equilibrium CIU joins ERCin a coalition if and only if
σCIU
1 − σCIU
≥

1 −

kERC
 ERC
2

1 −

kPPC
σPPC
2
Similarly, in equilibrium CIU joins PPCin a coalition if and only if
σCIU
1 − σCIU
≤

1 −

kERC
 ERC
2

1 −

kPPC
σPPC
2
Thus,CIUjoins ERCinanequilibriumcoalitionwhenσCIU islargeenough, that
is, when CIU cares enough about the sovereignty issue. CIU will join PPC in an
equilibrium coalition when σCIU is small enough, that is, when CIU cares enough
about being rightist. See Figs. 4 and 5.
Notice thatUCIU(e∗
CIU,ERC,1) ≥ UCIU(1,s∗
CIU,PPC) if and only if eCIU,PPC ≤
e∗
CIU,ERC if and only if sCIU,ERC ≥ s∗
CIU,PPC.
s
0 1 
1
• •
•
UERC=0
UCIU=0
UPPC=0
e
UPSC-IC=0
(e*CIU,ERC, s*CIU,ERC)
(e*CIU,PPC, s*CIU,PPC)
•
Fig. 4 Coalition CIU-PPC forms in equilibrium when CIU is the dominant party, A(CIU, PSC− IC) =
Ø, A(PSC− IC, ERC, PPC) = Øa n dσCIU small
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s
0 1 
1
• •
••
UERC=0 UCIU=0
UPPC=0
e
UPSC-IC=0
(e*CIU,ERC, s*CIU,ERC)
(e*CIU,PPC, s*CIU,PPC)
Fig.5 CoalitionCIU–ERCformsinequilibriumwhenCIUisthedominantparty, A(CIU, PSC−IC)=Ø,
A(PSC–IC, ERC,PPC)=Ø and σCIU large
In case coalition CIU with ERC forms the equilibrium policies will be those
(e∗,s∗) such that e∗ ∈

 eCIU,PPC,e∗
CIU,ERC

and s∗ = 1. Similarly, when coalition
CIU with PPCforms the equilibrium policies will be those (e,s) such that e∗ = 1
and s∗ ∈

 sCIU,ERC,s∗
CIU,PPC

.
Case 2: A(CIU, PSC+ IC)  = ∅ and A(PSC+ IC, ERC, PPC) = ∅.
Suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with PSC + IC is
not empty and the set of policies for the three party coalition is empty. In this case, the
possibilities for equilibrium coalitions are CIU with ERC, CIU with PSC + IC,
and CIU with PPC. Therefore, CIU is clearly the key party, and has to choose
among all the other parties its partner in the governing coalition.
TheutilitythatCIUobtainsfromthebestofferofeachpossiblepartnerisgivenby:
UCIU(e∗
CIU,ERC,1) = kCIU −  CIU

1 − e∗
CIU,ERC
2
UCIU(1,s∗
CIU,PPC) = kCIU − σCIU

1 − s∗
CIU,PPC
2
UCIU(e∗
CIU,PSC+IC,s∗
CIU,PSC+IC) = kCIU −  CIU

1 − e∗
CIU,PSC+IC
2
−σCIU

1 − s∗
CIU,PSC+IC
2
The equilibrium outcome depends on the utility that CIUderives from each policy
offer:
(i) if eCIU,PSC+IC ≤ eCIU,PPC ≤ e∗
CIU,ERC and sCIU,PSC+IC ≤ s∗
CIU,PPC ≤
 sCIU,ERC then C∗ = (CIU, ERC) and (e∗,s∗) is such that e∗ ∈ ( eCIU,PPC,
e∗
CIU,ERC) and s∗ = 1.
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(ii) if eCIU,PSC+IC ≤ e∗
CIU,ERC ≤  eCIU,PPC and sCIU,PSC+IC ≤ sCIU,ERC ≤
s∗
CIU,PPC then C∗ = (CIU, PPC) and (e∗,s∗) is such that e∗ = 1 and
s∗ ∈

 sCIU,ERC,s∗
CIU,PPC

.
Noticethattheanalysisofthesetwosub-casesisexactlyliketheoneperformed
in case one. Thus, the conditions obtained there also hold here: coalition CIU
with ERCformsforlargevaluesofσCIU andcoalitionCIUwith PPCforms
for small values of σCIU .
(iii) if eCIU,PPC ≤  eCIU,PSC+IC ≤ e∗
CIU,ERC and s∗
CIU,PPC ≤ sCIU,PSC+IC ≤
 sCIU,ERC then C∗ = (CIU, ERC) and (e∗,s∗) is such that e∗ ∈
( eCIU,PSC+IC,e∗
CIU,ERC) and s∗ = 1.
(iv) if e∗
CIU,ERC ≤  eCIU,PSC+IC ≤  eCIU,PPC and sCIU,ERC ≤ sCIU,PSC+IC ≤
s∗
CIU,PPC then C∗ = (CIU, PPC) and (e∗,s∗) is such that e∗ = 1 and
s∗ ∈

 sCIU,PSC+IC,s∗
CIU,PPC

.
The analysis of these two sub-cases is similar to the previous ones, except
that here the party that poses a relevant threat to the equilibrium coalition
is PSC + IC, thus, the policies that can be implemented in equilibrium are
determinedbyPSC+IC’soffers.Oncemore,weobtainasaresultthatcoalition
CIUwith ERCforms for large values of σCIU and coalition CIUwith PPC
forms for small values of σCIU .
(v) if  eCIU,PPC ≤ e∗
CIU,ERC ≤  eCIU,PSC+IC and s∗
CIU,PPC ≤  sCIU,ERC ≤
 sCIU,PSC+IC then C∗ = (CIU, PSC+ IC) and (e∗,s∗) ∈ A(CIU,
PSC+ IC) ∩

(e,s) : UCIU(e,s) ≥ UCIU

e∗
CIU,ERC,1
	
(vi) if e∗
CIU,ERC ≤  eCIU,PPC ≤  eCIU,PSC+IC and  sCIU,ERC ≤ s∗
CIU,PPC ≤
 sCIU,PSC+IC then C∗ = (CIU, PSC+ IC) and (e∗,s∗) ∈ A(CIU,
PSC+ IC) ∩

(e,s) : UCIU(e,s) ≥ UCIU

1,s∗
CIU,PPC
	
Intheselasttwosub-casesthepartychosenbyCIUtoformthegoverningcoalition
is PSC+IC.Thesecasesarenotlikelytobepartofanequilibriumbecausetheoffers
from PSC+ ICmay defeat the best offers from CIU’s neighbors (ERCand PPC)
only under very special conditions. In particular, CIU’s value of holding ofﬁce must
be relatively small and PSC+ IC’s value of holding ofﬁce must be relatively large.
See Fig. 6.
Case 3: A(CIU, PSC + IC) = ∅ and A(PSC + IC, ERC, PPC)  = ∅ Now,
suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with PSC + IC is
empty and the set of policies for the three party coalition is not empty. In this case, the
possibilities for equilibrium coalitions are CIU with ERC and CIU with PPC as
before, and in addition we have the three party coalition formed by PSC+ IC with
ERCand PPC.
The different equilibrium outcomes in this case are as follows:
(i) ife∗
ERC,CIU≤ eERC,PPC,s∗
PPC,CIU≤ sPPC;ERCandUCIU

 eERC,PPC,1

>
UCIU

1,s∗
CIU,PPC

then C∗ = (CIU, ERC) and (e∗,s∗) is such that e∗ ∈

 eCIU,PPC, eERC,PPC

and s∗ = 1.
123262 E. Aragonès
s
0 1 
1
• •
••
e
UCIU=0
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Fig. 6 Coalition CIU–ERC forms in equilibrium when CIU is the dominant party, A(CIU,PSC–IC) = Ø,
A(PSC–IC,ERC,PPC)=Ø, and σCIU large
(ii) ife∗
ERC,CIU≤ eERC,PPC,s∗
PPC,CIU≤ sPPC;ERCandUCIU

 eERC,PPC,1

≤
UCIU

1,s∗
CIU,PPC

then there is no equilibrium.
(iii) ife∗
ERC,CIU ≤ eERC,PPC,s∗
PPC,CIU ≤ sPPC;ERCandUCIU

e∗
CIU,ERC,1

<
UCIU

1, sPPC,ERC

thenC∗ = (CIU, PPC)and(e∗,s∗)issuchthate∗ = 1
and s∗ ∈

 sCIU,ERC, sPPC,ERC

.
(iv) ife∗
ERC,CIU ≤ eERC,PPC,s∗
PPC,CIU ≤ sPPC;ERCandUCIU

e∗
CIU,ERC,1

≥
UCIU

1, sPPC,ERC

then there is no equilibrium.
(v) if e∗
ERC,CIU ≤  eERC,PPC and s∗
PPC,CIU ≥  sPPC,ERC then C∗ =
(CIU, ERC) and (e∗,s∗) is such that e∗ ∈

e∗
ERC,CIU, eERC,PPC

and
s∗ = 1.
(vi) if e∗
ERC,CIU ≥  eERC,PPC and s∗
PPC,CIU ≤  sPPC;ERC then C∗ =
(CIU, PPC)and(e∗,s∗)issuchthate∗ = 1ands∗ ∈

s∗
PPC,CIU, sPPC,ERC

.
The analysis of these cases is similar to the previous ones, and we still have that
coalition CIU with ERC forms for large values of σCIU and coalition CIU with
PPCforms for small values of σCIU.
Consider the following set of policies:
 P =

(e,s) : UERC(e,s) ≥ UERC

e∗
ERC,CIU,1

,
UPPC(e,s) ≥ UPPC

1,s∗
PPC,CIU
	
(vii) if  P ∩ A(ERC, PPC, PSC+ IC)  = ∅ then C∗ = (ERC, PPC, PSC+
IC) and (e∗,s∗) ∈  P ∩ A(ERC, PPC, PSC+ IC).
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UCIU=0
s
0 1 
1
• •
••
e
UERC=0
UPSC-IC=0
(e∼ERC,PPC, 1) 
(1, s∼PPC,ERC)
Fig.7 CoalitionCIU–PPCformsinequilibriumwhenCIUisthedominantparty,A(PSC–IC,ERC,PPC) =
Øa n dσCIU small
(viii) if e∗
ERC,CIU ≥ eERC,PPC,s∗
PPC,CIU ≥ sPPC;ERC and  P ∩ A(ERC, PPC,
PSC+ IC) = ∅ then we have no equilibrium.
In Aragones (2007) it is shown that the conditions under which the three party
coalition may be part of an equilibrium outcome are very restrictive. It is necessary
that the reservation values for the three parties in the coalition are large enough in
order to guarantee a non empty set of acceptable policies for the three party coalition,
and in addition it is necessary that the reservation value of CIU is small enough in
order to have it forming in equilibrium. When this is not the case, CIU will play the
role of the key party and will choose its partner as before. See Fig. 7.
Case 4: A(CIU, PSC+ IC)  = ∅ and A(PSC+ IC, ERC, PPC)  = ∅
Suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with PSC + IC is
not empty and the set of policies for the three party coalition is not empty. This case
is analyzed in detail in Aragones (2007) and it is shown that the coalition between
PSC+ ICand CIUcannot be part of an equilibrium outcome, because the key party
in this case, CIU, will always prefer one of the offers from either ERCor PPCto
any offer from PSC + IC. Thus, the outcomes in this case coincide with the ones
found in case 3.
Summary of results for the dominant party scenario
I have found that coalition CIU with PPC forms in equilibrium whenever party
CIU’s relative preference intensity for nationalism (σCIU) is small enough. Other-
wise, I have shown that coalition CIU with ERC forms in equilibrium whene-
ver party CIU’s relative preference intensity for nationalism (σCIU) is large
enough.
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For values of σCIU close to 1/2 we may have different equilibrium outcomes. If the
setofacceptablepoliciesbythethreepartycoalitionisemptythencoalitionCIUwith
PSC+ICmayforminequilibriumifkPSC+ICislargeenough.Ifthesetofacceptable
policies by the three party coalition is not empty then existence of equilibrium is only
guaranteed under certain conditions. When they hold we can also have the three party
coalition, PSC+ IC with ERCand PPCforming in equilibrium. For intermediate
values of σCIU, coalition PSC+ IC with ERCand PPCmay form in equilibrium
onlywhenσPPCislargeenoughandσERCissmallenough,kERCandkPPCaresmall
enough and u∗
CIU − kCIU is large enough. Otherwise we would have cycles.
Notice that the parameter value that in most cases determines which equilibrium
prevailsisσCIU.Observethattheconditionsforexistenceofequilibriawithgoverning
coalitions CIU with PPCand CIU with ERCare much weaker that those needed
fortheequilibriawithgoverning coalition PSC+ICwith ERCand PPC. Thus,the
key party in the ‘dominant party scenario’ coincides with the dominant party itself,
which in this case was CIU.
Aparallelanalysiswouldshowthattheequilibriumoutcomeswhenparty PSC+IC
is the dominant party can be obtained likewise.
3.2 Dominated party scenario
Suppose that we are in the dominated party scenario and party PPCis the dominated
party. In this case we have that: vPSC+IC + vERC > 1
2,vPSC+IC + vCIU > 1
2 and
vERC + vCIU > 1
2. Thus, the minimal winning coalitions are given by: ERC with
PSC+ IC, ERCwith CIU, and PSC+ IC with CIU.
The relevant strategies in this scenario are the following: party PSC + IC may
accept to form a coalition with either party ERC or party CIU; party ERC may
accept to form a coalition with either party PSC + IC or party CIU; ﬁnally, party
CIUmayaccepttoformacoalitionwitheitherparty PSC+ICorparty ERC.Thus,
therearethreepossibleoutcomes inthisscenario. Idivide theanalysis intwodifferent
cases that depend on whether the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with
PSC+ IC is empty or not.
Case 1: A(CIU, PSC+ IC) = ∅
Suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with PSC + IC is
empty. In this case, the only possibilities for equilibrium coalitions are ERC with
CIU and ERC with PSC + IC. In this case ERC has to choose his governing
partner betweenCIUand PSC+IC. Since neitherCIUnor PSC+ICcan have an
alternativefeasibleoffertoformagoverningcoalition,theycanonlycompetebetween
themselves to become ERC’s partner in the governing coalition.
Since CIU’s maximal compromise policy is (e∗
ERC,CIU,1) and PSC + IC’s is
(0,s∗
ERC,PSC+IC), by comparing the utility that ERCderives from each offer we can
ﬁnd out the equilibrium outcome. Since
UERC(e∗
ERC,CIU,1) = kERC −  ERC

e∗
ERC,CIU
2
UERC(0,s∗
ERC,PSC+IC) = kERC − σERC

1 − s∗
ERC,PSC+IC
2
123The key party in the Catalan government 265
and e∗
ERC,CIU =

kCIU
 CIU, s∗
ERC,PSC+IC =

kPSC+IC
σPSC+IC and  ERC = 1 − σERC,w e
have that in equilibrium ERCjoins CIU in a coalition if and only if
σERC
1 − σERC
≥

1 −

kCIU
 CIU
2

1 −

kPSC+IC
σPSC+IC
2
Similarly, in equilibrium ERCjoins PSC+ IC in a coalition if and only if
σERC
1 − σERC
≤

1 −

kCIU
 CIU
2

1 −

kPSC+IC
σPSC+IC
2
Thus, ERCjoinsCIUinanequilibriumcoalitionwhenσERCislargeenough,that
is,when ERCcares enough about the sovereignty issue. ERCwilljoin PSC+ICin
anequilibriumcoalitionwhenσERCissmallenough,thatis,when ERCcaresenough
about being leftist. See Figs. 8 and 9.
Notice that UERC(e∗
ERC,CIU,1) ≥ UERC(0,s∗
ERC,PSC+IC) if and only if
e∗
ERC,CIU ≤ eERC,PSC+IC if and only if sERC,CIU ≥ s∗
ERC,PSC+IC.
In case coalition ERC with CIU forms the equilibrium policies will be those
(e∗,s∗) such that e∗ ∈

e∗
ERC,CIU, eERC,PSC+IC

and s∗ = 1. Similarly, when
s
0 1 
1
• •
••
e
UCIU=0 UERC=0
UPSC-IC=0
(e*ERC,CIU, s*ERC,CIU)
(e*ERC,PSC+IC, s*ERC,PSC+IC)
Fig.8 Coalition ERC–PSC+ICformsin equilibriumwhen PPC isthe dominated party, A(CIU, PSC) =
Øa n dσERC small
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Fig. 9 Coalition ERC–CIU forms in equilibrium when PPC is the dominated party, A(CIU,PSC–IC)=Ø
and σERC large
coalition ERC with PSC + IC forms the equilibrium policies will be those (e,s)
such that e∗ = 1 and s∗ ∈

 sERC,CIU,s∗
ERC,PSC+IC

.
Case 2: A(CIU, PSC+ IC)  = ∅.
SupposethatthesetofacceptablepoliciesforcoalitionCIUwith PSC+ICisnot
empty. In this case, the possibilities for equilibrium coalitions are ERC with CIU,
ERCwith PSC+ IC, and CIU with PSC+ IC.
The equilibrium outcomes in this case are as follows:
(i) if e∗
CIU,ERC ≥  eCIU,PSC+IC and UERC

 eCIU,PSC+IC,1

>
UERC

0,s∗
ERC,PSC+IC

then C∗ = (ERC,CIU) and (e∗,s∗) is such that
e∗ ∈

 eCIU,PSC+IC, eERC,PSC+IC

and s∗ = 1. Notice that in this case it is
necessary that σERC is large enough.
(ii) if e∗
CIU,ERC ≥  eCIU,PSC+IC and UERC

 eCIU,PSC+IC,1

≤ UERC(0,
s∗
ERC,PSC+IC

then there is no equilibrium.
(iii) if s∗
PSC+IC,ERC ≤  sPSC+IC,CIU and UERC

e∗
ERC,CIU,1

< UERC(0,
 sPSC+IC,CIU

thenC∗ = (ERC, PSC+ IC)and(e∗,s∗)issuchthate∗ = 1
and s∗ ∈

 sPSC+IC,CIU, sERC,CIU

. Notice that in this case it is necessary
that σERC is small enough.
(iv) if s∗
PSC+IC,ERC ≤  sPSC+IC,CIU and UERC

e∗
ERC,CIU,1

≥ UERC(0,
 sPSC+IC,CIU

then there is no equilibrium. Consider the following set of
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UPSC-IC=0
(e∼CIU,PSC+IC, 1) 
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Fig. 10 Coalition ERC–PSC+IC forms in equilibrium when PPC is the dominated party, A(CIU,PSC–
IC) = Øa n dσERC small
policies: 
 P =

(e,s) : UCIU(e,s) ≥ UCIU

e∗
CIU,ERC,1

,UPSC+IC(e,s) ≥
UPSC+IC

0,s∗
PSC+IC,ERC
	
(v) if 
 P  = ∅ then C∗ = (CIU, PSC+ IC) and (e∗,s∗) ∈ 
 P. Notice that in this
case it is necessary that kERC is small enough.
(vi) if e∗
CIU,ERC ≤ eCIU,PSC+IC,s∗
PSC+IC,ERC ≥ sPSC+IC,CIU and 
 P = ∅ then
we have no equilibrium.
The analysis of these cases is similar to the one performed for the dominant party
scenario. The conditions obtained here are parallel to those found there: coalition
ERCwith CIUforms for large values of σERC and coalition ERCwith PSC+ IC
forms for small values of σERC. Only under very special conditions coalition CIU
with PSC+ICforms.Inparticular, ERC’svalueofholdingofﬁcemustberelatively
small and CIUand PSC+ IC’s value of holding ofﬁce must be relatively large. See
Figs. 10 and 11.
Summary of results for the dominated party scenario
I have found that coalition ERC with CIU forms in equilibrium whenever party
ERC’s relative preference intensity for nationalism (σERC) is large enough. Other-
wise,Ihaveshownthatcoalition ERCwith PSC+ICformsinequilibriumwhenever
party ERC’s relative preference intensity for nationalism (σERC) is small enough.
For values of σERC close to 1/2, existence of equilibrium is only guaranteed under
certain conditions. When they hold we can have coalition CIU with PSC + IC
forming in equilibrium. For intermediate values of σERC, coalition PSC+ IC with
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Fig. 11 Coalition ERC–CIU forms in equilibrium when PPC is the dominated party, A(CIU,
PSC− IC)  = Ø. and σERC large
CIU may form in equilibrium but only when kERC is small enough and kCIU and
kPSC+IC are large enough. Otherwise we would have cycles.
I have shown that the parameter value that determines in most cases which equili-
brium prevails is σERC. Observe that the conditions for existence of equilibria with
governing coalitions ERC with CIU and ERC with PSC + IC are much weaker
that those needed for the equilibria with governing coalition PSC+ IC with CIU.
Thus, the key party in the ‘dominated party scenario’ coincides with the party that
opposes completely the dominated party in the ideological space, which in this case
is ERC, because even if party ERC is not a dominant party it is decisive in almost
all cases to determine the composition of the governing coalition.
A parallel analysis would show that the equilibrium outcomes when party ERCis
the dominated party can be obtained likewise.
4 Discussion of the results
From the results obtained in the formal model we can explain some determinants of
the magnitude of the key party’s advantage:
Extreme relative preference intensity: The more extreme the relative preference
intensity for one of the two issues, the less likely the existence of the equilibrium in
which the key player is left out.
Size of the key party’s set of acceptable policies: The larger is the key party’s value
of holding ofﬁce, that is, the larger is its set of acceptable policies, the more likely the
equilibrium coalition will be the one chosen by the key party.
Size of a coalition’s set of acceptable policies: The smaller the set of policies
that are acceptable by the coalitions that do not have the key party as a member, the
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larger the advantage of the key party. As an example of this implication, consider
the explicit claim made during the last two legislatures by ERCand PPCthat they
wouldnoteverbemembersofthesamecoalition.Thisclaimcanberepresentedinmy
model by assuming that the set of acceptable policies by this coalition is empty, that
is, A(ERC, PPC) = ∅. This claim is irrelevant in the dominated party scenario,
since in this case the coalitions that involve the dominated party do not play any
role (because they are not winning coalitions). However, it has some relevance in the
dominantpartyscenario,sinceitimpliesthatthethreepartycoalitionhasanemptyset
of acceptable policies and this softens the threats that parties can offer to the dominant
party, therefore it improves the dominant party’s bargain position.
Next I discuss a couple of possible extensions of the formal model:
Vote share and endogenous value of holding ofﬁce: I have assumed that parties care
mostlyaboutholdingofﬁce,andonlyinstrumentallyaboutpolicy,andIhaverepresen-
ted a party’s value of holding ofﬁce as an exogenous positive constant. Relaxing this
assumption, one could think that a party’s expected vote in future elections depends
positively on the vote support obtained by the party in the current election. Thus I
could represent the present value of holding ofﬁce by an increasing function of the
party’s current vote share. Suppose that ki = k (vi) with k 
i (vi) ≥ 0. In this case we
will ﬁnd that the larger the vote share of a party, the larger the utility that it derives
from holding ofﬁce, and the more it would be willing to compromise its policy posi-
tion in order to become a member of the winning coalition. Thus, the sets of policies
that are individually rational will be larger for parties with larger vote share. In both
the dominant and the dominated party scenarios the size of the vote share of the key
player affects the likelihood of existence of the equilibrium in which the key player
is left out in a very intuitive way: the larger the vote share of the key party, the less
likely it is that the winning coalition that leaves it out can be part of an equilibrium.
Revelation of the parties’ preferences: The equilibrium outcomes obtained depend
on the parties’ values of holding ofﬁce (ki) and on their relative intensity of prefe-
rences between the two issues (σi ). These values are private information, and it is
not obvious that parties will have incentives to reveal their true value. Since the equi-
librium outcomes corresponding to a set of parameter values are given by a unique
governingcoalitionandacontinuumofpolicies,itispossibletothinkofanequilibrium
reﬁnement based on the parties’ incentives to reveal their private information.
5 Implications
The results of my model show that in each possible scenario there is one party that has
a clear advantage. I call it the key party. Empirical results from the Catalan elections
imply that CIU and PSC + IC are the only parties that could play the role of the
dominant party, and ERCand PPC are the only ones that could play the role of the
dominated party.
When I consider the governments formed in Catalonia between 1980 and 2006, I
ﬁnd that out of the eight different legislatures, six of them are characterized by the
dominant party scenario, and only two of them can be represented by the dominated
party scenario. I ﬁnd that PSC+IC was the dominant party in 1980, CIU has been the
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Table 3 Percentage of seats corresponding to each ideological group
80 84 88 92 95 99 03 06
CIU 31.85 3 .3∗ 51.1∗ 51.8∗ 44.4∗ 41.5∗ 34.13 5 .5
ERC 10.43 .74 .48 .19 .68 .91 7 .0∗ 15.5∗
PPC 13.38 .16 .75 .11 2 .68 .91 1 .11 2 .6
PSC+ IC 44.4∗ 34.83 7 .83 4 .83 3 .34 0 .73 7 .83 6 .3
∗ denotes the key party
dominant party between 1984 and 1999, and PPC has been the dominated party in
2003 and 2006. Furthermore, out of the ﬁve legislatures in which CIU has been the
dominant party, in three instances CIU has held an absolute majority. See Table 3.
In 1980 the governing coalition that formed included CIU, ERC, and UCD, despite
PSC+IC was the dominant party. I will not go further into the analysis of the 1980
election because in that election the number of parties that obtained representation
in the parliament was much larger than four and the results of our analysis would be
much weaker, since I would have to assume that several parties that share the same
ideological views over the two dimensions are treated as a unique strategic agent with
a common objective. I think that this assumption is too strong and therefore, its results
should not be considered as signiﬁcant.
The ﬁrst three instances in which CIU was a dominant party, CIU had an absolute
majority of seats in the parliament, thus, obviously in those cases the government
was formed by party CIU alone; there was no need to bargain over policy, and the
policy implemented should be interpreted as CIU’s ideal point. In the other cases in
which CIU was the dominant party (the legislatures starting at 1995 and 1999) a CIU
minority government formed with the support of PPC, thus the ‘de facto’ governing
coalition was formed by CIU with PPC. Finally, the governing coalition formed in
2003 and 2006, when PPC was the dominated party, was the three-party coalition that
included PSC, IC and ERC.
If we consider possible government coalitions for the future, given the trend of the
vote in the past years, we should expect that, as in the past, there will be two parties
that will obtain a large share of the seats, and the other two parties will obtain a much
smallershare.Thus,itisplausibletoexpectthatalsointhefutureCIUand PSC+IC
will be the only parties that could play the role of the dominant party, and ERCand
PPCwill be the only ones that could play the role of the dominated party.
6 Strategic implications
Giventheclearadvantageofthekeyparty,itmaybeintheinterestofeachpartytoﬁnd
outhowtoincreaseitschancesofbecomingthekeyparty.Sincethevoteshareofeach
party can be thought of being determined as an outcome of the electoral campaign, a
party’sobjectiveduringthecampaignmayimplytoobtainacertaincompositionofthe
parliament such that the party maximizes his chances of becoming the key party in the
formation of the governing coalition. Since CIUand PSC+ ICare the only parties
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that could play the role of the dominant party, they will be interested in obtaining an
election result that forces a dominant party scenario in which themselves are the key
party. Similarly, since ERCand PPCare the only ones that could play the role of the
dominated party, they would prefer an election result that leads to a dominated party
scenario in which themselves are the key party.
The results obtained from our analysis imply that compared to the current compo-
sition of the parliament and besides increasing their own share of seats, the Catalan
parties’s preferences with respect to the parliament composition for the coming elec-
tions are as follows:
CIU would like PPC to increase its share of the seats and PSC + IC to
decrease its share: CIU would like to maintain a larger proportion of seats than
PSC+ IC so that increasing PPC’s proportion will take Catalan politics back to a
dominant party scenario with CIU being the key party.
PSC + IC would like CIU to decrease its share of the seats, and PPC to
increase its share, so that PSC+ ICcould become the key party in a dominant party
scenario.
ERCwould like PPCnot to increase its share, so that the current dominated
party scenario continues with ERCbeing the key party.
PPC would like ERC to decrease its share of seats so that Catalan politics
moves to a new dominated party scenario with ERCbeing the dominated party and
PPCbeing the key party.
Considering that the nationalist vote has been held constant over the last elections
(see Graphs 1 and 2), if we expect this trend to continue in the future we should
expect that the number of parliament seats corresponding to centralist parties equals
that corresponding to nationalist parties, that is, vCIU + vERC ≈ vPSC+IC + vPPC.
This implies that CIU’s best option is feasible (increase CIU and PPC’s share and
decrease PSC+ IC’s share) but PSC+ IC best option would not be feasible since
it involves increasing both the vote for PSC+ IC and the vote for PPC.
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